MCAI · Incomplete repair

Closes one branch of two

Blocks the tax wallet but leaves the dead-wallet branch, so anyone can still burn anyone’s tokens.

Not solved

The exploit is blocked, but 1 of 4 security obligations fails: the repair is incomplete.

Exploitblockedhistorical attack
Security3 / 4obligations pass
Legitimate use12 / 12obligations pass
Canariesresidual vulnerabilitytamper and breakage flags
acceptsAn exploit-only check would accept this fix. The exploit really is blocked, which is what makes it look finished. The obligations are what reject it.
The checks

What ran, and what it said.

Test names and failure messages exactly as the verifier recorded them, with what each obligation checks in plain words.

Exploit

1 replay · profit over 11 ETH
  • ✓The DeFiHackLabs reproduction of the attack: blockedIt fails in the attack or profit step, for a reason the task declares.test/poc.t.sol:MCAI_PoC:testExploit()ERC20: transfer amount exceeds allowance

Security obligations

3 / 4 pass
  • ✓The tax wallet cannot move an ordinary holder’s tokens without approvalThe bug stated for every holder, not just the pool the exploit drained.test/hidden/security.t.sol:MCAI_Security:test_taxwallet_cannot_move_holder_tokens_without_approval()
  • ✓The tax wallet cannot move the pool’s tokens without approvalChecked on the balance change itself, so a fix that breaks the allowance view cannot game it.test/hidden/security.t.sol:MCAI_Security:test_taxwallet_cannot_move_pair_tokens_without_approval()
  • ✓With approval, the tax wallet’s allowance is debited by exactly what it movesThe original moved the tokens and debited nothing.test/hidden/security.t.sol:MCAI_Security:test_taxwallet_transferFrom_debits_allowance()
  • ✗No one can burn a holder’s tokens to the dead wallet without approvalThe second branch of the same broken helper. A fix aimed only at the tax wallet leaves it open.test/hidden/security.t.sol:MCAI_Security:test_unapproved_spender_cannot_burn_to_dead_wallet()next call did not revert as expected

Legitimate use · behaviour

7 / 7 pass
  • ✓Buying through the pool the incident used still worksIncludes the token’s fee path.test/hidden/regression.t.sol:MCAI_Regression:test_amm_buy_works()
  • ✓Approve, then transferFrom, works and debits the allowance exactlyA fix that disables transferFrom, or never debits, fails here.test/hidden/regression.t.sol:MCAI_Regression:test_approved_transferFrom_works_and_debits_allowance()
  • ✓Token metadata and the pool’s balance are intactDecimals still 9, supply and symbol present, the pool still holds MCAI.test/hidden/regression.t.sol:MCAI_Regression:test_metadata_preserved()
  • ✓A holder-to-holder transfer workstest/hidden/regression.t.sol:MCAI_Regression:test_normal_transfer_works()
  • ✓With approval, the tax wallet can still spend like anyone elseA fix cannot close the hole by blocking the tax wallet forever.test/hidden/regression.t.sol:MCAI_Regression:test_taxwallet_transferFrom_with_approval_moves_tokens()
  • ✓transferFrom takes exactly the amount out of the senderCatches a fix that quietly credits the sender back: an unlimited mint.test/hidden/regression.t.sol:MCAI_Regression:test_transferFrom_debits_the_sender_exactly()
  • ✓A spender with no approval still cannot move tokensA fix that removes the allowance check altogether fails here.test/hidden/regression.t.sol:MCAI_Regression:test_unapproved_spender_cannot_move_tokens()

Legitimate use · interface

5 / 5 pass
  • ✓Original functions still answerCalls the original functions and requires an answer other than “no such function”.test/hidden/invariants_auto.t.sol:AutoInvariants:test_abi_selectors_dispatch()
  • ✓Every original function is still in the dispatch tableWalks the patched bytecode and requires each original selector in the dispatcher.test/hidden/invariants_auto.t.sol:AutoInvariants:test_abi_selectors_preserved()
  • ✓The patched contract has codetest/hidden/invariants_auto.t.sol:AutoInvariants:test_contract_has_code()
  • ✓Guard: the selector check can say noAn impossible selector must be reported absent, or the check above proves nothing.test/hidden/invariants_auto.t.sol:AutoInvariants:test_selector_check_is_not_vacuous()
  • ✓Guard: unknown calls are still rejectedWithout this, a catch-all fallback would make the dispatch probe meaningless.test/hidden/invariants_auto.t.sol:AutoInvariants:test_unknown_selector_is_rejected()

The patch

against the original source
src/contracts/Token.sol+1 −1
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@256256        address spender,257257        uint256 amount258258    ) private view returns (uint256) {259−        return msg.sender != _taxWallet && (owner == _uniswapPair || spender != _deadWallet) ? amount : 0;259+        return msg.sender == _taxWallet ? amount : (spender != _deadWallet ? amount : 0);260260    }261261262262    function transferFrom(

Re-run this grade

offline · same inputs

Needs Foundry 1.7.1 with solc 0.8.30, 0.8.26 and 0.8.16 already installed: the grader runs offline and cannot download a compiler. Python 3.12 or later. Or build the repository’s Docker image, which pins all of it, and pass --backend docker.

Terminal
$ git clone https://github.com/FarseenSh/evmpatch-env.git && cd evmpatch-env
$ git checkout 165c0ed
$ python -m evmpatch_env.sandbox tasks/mcai_2025_01 \
    --patch worked_example/mcai_2025_01/controls/taxwallet_sender_only_fix/Token.sol \
    --backend local --sha256

Expected output: core aeac1b3ac3b6227145f819133f0db929ab06fc28b847edcb1a52297ef08833e6 and strict 06387ac34c64cdbfb44855003433669dbcbb4421d321807ca02463a827b02337.

To check a downloaded grade file instead: shasum -a 256 grade.strict.json prints the strict hash.

Control note

from the repository

Rejects only msg.sender == _taxWallet and leaves the _deadWallet branch of the same broken function, so any caller can still burn any holder's balance with no approval. Expected: not_solved, canary residual_vulnerability.

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