GoldReserve · Complete repair
Reference repair
Settles the claim debt for mints and transfers alike, after the balance update.
Solved
The exploit is blocked for a declared reason, and all 3 security and 9 legitimate-use obligations pass.
Exploitblockedhistorical attack
Security3 / 3obligations pass
Legitimate use9 / 9obligations pass
Canariesnonetamper and breakage flags
acceptsAn exploit-only check would also accept this fix. Here the hidden obligations agree.
The checks
What ran, and what it said.
Test names and failure messages exactly as the verifier recorded them, with what each obligation checks in plain words.
Exploit
1 replay · profit over 12 BNB- ✓The DeFiHackLabs reproduction of the attack: blockedIt fails in the attack or profit step, for a reason the task declares.test/poc.t.sol:GoldReserve_PoC:testExploit()Nada a reclamar
Security obligations
3 / 3 pass- ✓Holders are paid only for the NFTs they held when the profit accruedTwo holders with the same stake must be paid the same, however many NFTs one mints later.test/hidden/security.t.sol:GoldReserve_Security:test_a_holder_is_paid_only_for_the_nfts_it_held_when_profit_accrued()
- ✓Moving paid NFTs to a fresh address cannot claim the same profit againThe step the incident repeated 22 times, restated without a flash loan.test/hidden/security.t.sol:GoldReserve_Security:test_moving_the_nfts_to_a_fresh_address_cannot_reclaim_the_same_profit()
- ✓An NFT minted after a deposit earns nothing from that depositThe mint half of the bug: deposit first, mint second.test/hidden/security.t.sol:GoldReserve_Security:test_nft_minted_after_a_deposit_inherits_no_profit()
Legitimate use · behaviour
4 / 4 pass- ✓Collection metadata is intactSymbol, name, mint price, supply, owner and token URI still read back.test/hidden/regression.t.sol:GoldReserve_Regression:test_metadata_preserved()
- ✓A holder from before a deposit can claim their share, exactly onceThe contract’s whole purpose.test/hidden/regression.t.sol:GoldReserve_Regression:test_mint_then_deposit_then_claim_pays_the_holder()
- ✓Minting at the listed price worksAnd updates the accounting.test/hidden/regression.t.sol:GoldReserve_Regression:test_mint_works()
- ✓An ordinary NFT transfer workstest/hidden/regression.t.sol:GoldReserve_Regression:test_nft_transfer_works()
Legitimate use · interface
5 / 5 pass- ✓Original functions still answerCalls the original functions and requires an answer other than “no such function”.test/hidden/invariants_auto.t.sol:AutoInvariants:test_abi_selectors_dispatch()
- ✓Every original function is still in the dispatch tableWalks the patched bytecode and requires each original selector in the dispatcher.test/hidden/invariants_auto.t.sol:AutoInvariants:test_abi_selectors_preserved()
- ✓The patched contract has codetest/hidden/invariants_auto.t.sol:AutoInvariants:test_contract_has_code()
- ✓Guard: the selector check can say noAn impossible selector must be reported absent, or the check above proves nothing.test/hidden/invariants_auto.t.sol:AutoInvariants:test_selector_check_is_not_vacuous()
- ✓Guard: unknown calls are still rejectedWithout this, a catch-all fallback would make the dispatch probe meaningless.test/hidden/invariants_auto.t.sol:AutoInvariants:test_unknown_selector_is_rejected()
The patch
against the original sourcesrc/contracts/Token.sol+34 −0
@@ -3937,6 +3937,40 @@39373937 require(success, "Falha ao enviar fundos");39383938 }393939393940+ // PATCH: carry the claim debt with the tokens.3941+ //3942+ // Entitlement is computed from the CURRENT balance (`balance * accumulatedProfitPerNFT`)3943+ // while the paid-out record lived on the address, so the same NFTs could be walked3944+ // through fresh addresses and claim the same profit again, and a freshly minted NFT3945+ // silently inherited every unit of profit accrued before it existed. Settling the debt3946+ // in _update() -- on mints as well as transfers -- keeps entitlement and record on the3947+ // same side of the ledger, so claimProfit() can only ever pay profit that accrued while3948+ // the caller actually held the token.3949+ function _update(3950+ address from,3951+ address to,3952+ uint256[] memory ids,3953+ uint256[] memory values3954+ ) internal virtual override {3955+ super._update(from, to, ids, values);3956+3957+ uint256 moved = 0;3958+ for (uint256 i = 0; i < values.length; i++) {3959+ moved += values[i];3960+ }3961+ if (moved == 0) {3962+ return;3963+ }3964+ uint256 debt = (moved * accumulatedProfitPerNFT) / 1e18;3965+ if (to != address(0)) {3966+ claimedProfitPerAddress[to] += debt;3967+ }3968+ if (from != address(0)) {3969+ uint256 owed = claimedProfitPerAddress[from];3970+ claimedProfitPerAddress[from] = owed > debt ? owed - debt : 0;3971+ }3972+ }3973+39403974 function _balanceOfAllNFTs(address account) internal view returns (uint256) {39413975 uint256 totalUserBalance = 0;39423976 for (uint256 i = 0; i < TOTAL_VARIATIONS; i++) {
Re-run this grade
offline · same inputsNeeds Foundry 1.7.1 with solc 0.8.30, 0.8.26 and 0.8.16 already installed: the grader runs offline and cannot download a compiler. Python 3.12 or later. Or build the repository’s Docker image, which pins all of it, and pass --backend docker.
Terminal
$ git clone https://github.com/FarseenSh/evmpatch-env.git && cd evmpatch-env $ git checkout 165c0ed $ python -m evmpatch_env.sandbox tasks/goldreserve_2025_02 --reference-patch --backend local --sha256
Expected output: core fd82c8e0842b0c008a5161adbd27bb8458668f208c1d4ab576f89da73ed4e0ea and strict fedc3b17c6e10f680349ce36d7dbac716571cd395ae109e733b5f2003f396868.
To check a downloaded grade file instead: shasum -a 256 grade.strict.json prints the strict hash.
Control note
from the repositoryThe task's own reference_patch.sol.diff: the claim debt is settled in _update() for mints and transfers alike, after super._update().